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Abstract 
 
Inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts can occur when witnesses are exposed to post-
event misinformation via discussion with a co-witness.  The current study examined 
the role of co-witness relationship by comparing the memory performance of pairs of 
romantic couples, friends and previously unacquainted strangers with that of 
individuals.  Ninety-six participants viewed an event and then discussed the witnessed 
event with a stranger, a romantic partner or a friend.  One member of each pair saw a 
theft take place during the witnessed event.  Individual group participants did not 
discuss the witnessed event with anyone. Results indicate that all co-witness dyads 
produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with 
another witness. However, witnesses who were previously acquainted with their co-
witness (either in a friendship or romantic relationship) were significantly more likely 
to report information obtained from their co-witness that they had not seen 
themselves.  Prior acquaintance also led to an increased number of incorrect 
attributions of both guilt and innocence.  
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Introduction 
A recent survey indicated that 86% of real eyewitnesses discussed their memory with 
a co-witness prior to giving evidence (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). Witnesses to an event 
may share the same experience but their individual recall of the event may differ for 
many reasons including naturally occurring differences in attention paid to various 
details of the event or perceived differences in ability to recall those details (Gabbert, 
Memon & Wright, 2006).  Recent research amply demonstrates that the most likely 
outcome when two witnesses discuss their memories is that their accounts of the 
witnessed event become more similar and, hence, seemingly corroborative (Gabbert, 
Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Mori, 2003; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). 
A witness is quite likely, in the general course of daily activity, to be in the 
company of someone they know when they witness a criminal or otherwise 
noteworthy incident in public (e.g. a robbery, mugging, assault etc.).  In a survey of 
actual witnesses, Paterson, Chapman and Kemp (2007) report that 77% of respondents 
who had themselves witnessed a crime indicated that they were previously acquainted 
with other witnesses at the scene. Of those who reported that they knew their co-
witnesses, 44% witnessed the events with friends, 33% with family members or 
partners, and 22% with others (e.g., co-workers, neighbours, parents’ friends, frequent 
customers).  It may be the case that recalled accounts from different ‘types’ of co-
witness (i.e. different sources) may affect the magnitude of the co-witness effect 
(Betz, Skowronski, & Ostrom, 1996; Bless, Strack & Walther, 2001). Yet, to date, 
studies of memory conformity between co-witnesses have not systematically 
examined the role of the relationship between co-witnesses, and typically recruit naïve 
(stranger) participant dyads or employ a confederate who is not known to the 
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participant (e.g. Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003; Gabbert et al., 2004; Meade & 
Roediger, 2002). 
This is an important limitation because recent research on co-witness influence 
suggests that the effect is not simply a memorial one.  In line with social comparison 
theory, the individual witness also relies on a number of other important social cues to 
assess and evaluate their co-witness (Bless et al., 2001; Festinger, 1954; Gabbert, 
Memon & Wright, 2007).   For example, several studies have manipulated the 
perceived accuracy, confidence and credibility of co-witnesses (e.g. Gabbert et al. 
2006; Wright et al., 2000).  Generally speaking, participants are most influenced by 
confident co-witnesses and witnesses who they believe benefited from some 
advantage (such as extended exposure duration).  For instance Wright et al. (2000, 
Experiment 2) designed an experimental procedure that required co-witnesses to 
interact and discuss their memories of cars.  Their analyses revealed that confidence 
ratings predicted which member of the dyad ultimately persuaded the other member 
of the dyad. Specifically, pairs tended to conform to the participant with the higher 
confidence.  In a study manipulating perceived encoding duration, Gabbert et al. 
(2006) found that participants who believed they had viewed the target stimulus for 
half the length of time as their co-witness partner were significantly more likely to 
include (mis)information obtained from their co-witness in their own individual 
report.  In other words, participants who believed they had experienced a shorter 
exposure duration than their co-witness (when in fact exposure durations were 
equivalent) were more likely to report errant information at test.  These participants 
were also less accurate in reporting critical items they had seen themselves. 
Finally, Kwong See et al. (2001) manipulated the credibility of the source of 
co-participant information by varying the age of the co-witness.  Participants were 
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presented with a narrative described as being an account of the event as remembered 
by a 28 year old, or an 82 year old. In fact the narratives were the same, each 
including four items of misinformation. After reading the narrative participants were 
asked to provide their impressions of the witness by rating their perceived competence 
and honesty. The older witness was rated as being less competent, but more honest, 
than the young witness and this perceived competence was associated with greater 
misinformation effects.  Taken together these findings (and other associated research) 
suggest important metacognitive and social components underpinning co-witness 
testimony. 
Absent from these investigations is any consideration of the role of the 
relationship between the co-witnesses and how this might contribute to co-witness 
susceptibility to information (i.e. when the source of the misinformation is a friend, 
romantic partner, or a stranger) in an episodic memory task.  However, research 
concerned with the social and reconstructive nature of remembering is instructive 
(Bartlett, 1932; Clark & Stephenson, 1995).  For instance, Hyman (1994) examined 
the role of social context in determining the content and structure of remembered 
information by requiring participants to either recall a story or describe their reactions 
to a story with either the experimenter or another participant.  Analyses suggested that 
participants interacting with another participant were more likely to engage in 
conversational remembering and include more personal reactions and evaluations in 
both conditions than those participants engaging with the experimenter (see also 
Marsh & Tversky, 2004).  These findings support the suggestion that remembering in 
real life contexts (such as might occur between co-witnesses) involves a greater focus 
on the exchange of impressions and evaluations (Dudukovic, Marsh & Tversky, 2004; 
Edwards & Middleton, 1986; Marsh, Tversky & Hutson, 2005; Tversky & Marsh, 
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2000).  Hyman (1994) also argues that in such contexts participants are more likely to 
be following various conversational rules (such as sharing new information and 
avoiding repeating old or redundant information) and also establishing social bonds.  
In a dyad where the members are already friends or romantic partners, social bonds 
already exist and will likely influence the course of conversational remembering.  For 
example, research shows that friends and couples typically develop unique ways of 
communicating in order to share cognitive demands and increase the chance of 
success in different tasks (Fleming & Darley, 1991; Fussell & Krauss, 1989). To this 
end, Wegner (1986) and Wegner, Erber and Raymond (1991) suggested that friends 
and couples develop a transactive memory system which allows for the sharing of an 
individual’s knowledge through close social networks based on knowledge of a friend 
or partner’s way of thinking.  Indeed, research shows that individuals in close 
relationships outperform stranger pairs in recall tasks by means of mutual cueing and 
increased cue effectiveness (Andersson, 2001; Andersson & Ronnberg, 1995, 1997; 
Fussell & Krauss, 1989).  However, it may be the case that, in certain situations or 
perhaps on certain types of memory tasks, relying on cues from a partner should be 
avoided in order to reduce inaccuracies in one’s own individual recall account.  This 
is precisely the question considered in the current study: will previously acquainted 
co-witnesses be more susceptible to misinformation (i.e. information they have not 
witnessed themselves) from their partner than co-witnesses who discuss the event 
with a stranger?  
The current study examined both romantic couple and friendship pairs given 
the research evidence suggesting that individuals in committed relationships may 
develop what has been termed ‘cognitive interdependence’ (Agnew, van Lange, 
Rusbult & Langston, 1998).  Agnew et al (1998) noted the pattern of links between 
 7 
cognitive interdependence and commitment while strong for romantic partners was 
weaker for friendship pairs.   Other research has shown that there may be dependence 
in both romantic relationships and friendships but that these effects tend to be stronger 
in romantic relationships (e.g. Rusbult, 1980; Lin & Rusbult, 1995). It is also the case 
that romantic relationships tend to be closer and more exclusive than friendships 
(Fehr, 1996).  Thus, the nature of the previous acquaintance may be important given 
that this factor may also affect conformity.  For instance, Walker and Heyns (1962) 
suggest that the degree of identification an individual feels with the source determines 
the level of conformity.  Intuitively, it might be argued that individuals have higher 
levels of identification and liking with close friends and romantic partners.  
Additionally, individuals will also be more likely to trust friends and partners as a 
source given that trust is one of the key elements of friendship (Claes & Poirier, 
1993).   
 However, to our knowledge, no studies have examined the effects of recalling 
a co-witnessed event with a friend or romantic partner on susceptibility to 
misinformation.  Thus, the current study compares the co-witness performance of 
previously acquainted pairs (romantic couples, friends) and previously unacquainted 
strangers with that of individuals, who do not collaborate.  In line with extant 
literature on the co-witness effect, we predict that co-witness performance will be 
impaired relative to individual performance.  Secondly, we predict that individuals in 
the previously acquainted friendship or couple dyads will be more susceptible to 
influence from their co-witness than individuals in stranger dyads. 
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Method 
Design and Participants 
Ninety-six participants were recruited (26 male; 70 female; 18 – 58 years; M = 21.73, 
SD = 7.01) and participated in exchange for course credit.  Of the 96 participants, 24 
participants discussed the witnessed event (see below) with a stranger they had not 
met prior to participating in the current study (Stranger condition), 48 participants 
discussed the event with either their romantic partner (Couples condition; n= 24) or a 
friend (Friends condition; n= 24) while the remaining 24 participants did not discuss 
the witnessed event with anyone (Individual condition).  As in previous research (e.g. 
Wegner et al., 1991), the recruitment criteria required friends and couple pairs to have 
known each other for at least 3 months prior to participating in the research.  In the 
Friends condition, participants reported knowing each other for an average of 40.83 
months (SD = 63.05; range 4 – 234 months) while in the Couples condition, 
participants reported an average relationship length of 43.58 months (SD = 38.37; 
range 8 - 134 months).   Length of relationship did not differ significantly between the 
Friend and Couples conditions (t < 1).   
Materials 
The stimulus event depicted a girl entering an unoccupied university office to return a 
borrowed book.  The film was shot from two different angles resulting in two video 
clips, each lasting one minute and 30 seconds.  Both clips contained exactly the same 
sequence of events, but were filmed from different angles so as to simulate different 
witness perspectives. This manipulation allowed different features of the event to be 
observed from each perspective. For example, from perspective ‘A’ (but not 
perspective B) it is possible to read the title of the book that the girl is carrying, and 
also observe that she throws a note into a dustbin when leaving the room. From 
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perspective ‘B’ (but not perspective A) the girl is seen checking the time on her 
watch, as well as committing an opportunistic crime (sliding a £10 note out of a wallet 
and putting it into her own pocket). All other actions and events that occur are 
common to both perspectives. This event has been used in previous co-witness 
research (Gabbert et al., 2003).  
Procedure 
Participants took part either individually or in a pairs (either as a pair of strangers, 
friends or as a couple) depending on the experimental condition. Details of the study 
prior to attendance were kept to a minimum.  On arrival, participants were informed 
that they would watch a short film.  In all conditions, participants were seated in front 
of a television monitor and watched the film on their own.  Half the participants in the 
individual condition saw perspective A, and half saw perspective B. Participants in 
the co-witness conditions were led to assume they were seeing the same video clip as 
their co-witness whereas, in fact, each viewed a different perspective of the same 
event. A screen was used to obstruct the view of the other co-witness while the video 
was being shown (there was no sound). To reduce any suspicion that two different 
films had been viewed, the experimenter explained that as only one television and 
video combination system was available on which to show the event and that both 
participants needed to have a clear view each would watch the event on their own.  An 
unrelated reaction time filler task, presented on a laptop, kept each witness occupied 
while the other viewed the video clip. 
After the video presentation, participants completed an unrelated filler task 
(for approximately five minutes) and then engaged in either a memory discussion 
(Strangers, Friends and Couples conditions) or memory rehearsal phase (Individual 
condition). Instructions requested participants to imagine that they were real witnesses 
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waiting for the police to arrive.  The questionnaire included a request for a free recall 
of the sequence of actions and events from the video, as well as answers to seven 
more specific questions about the event (e.g. ‘What was the color of her bag?’).  
Participants in the individual recall condition completed the questionnaire alone. 
Those in the co-witness condition were asked to complete this task with another 
witness by discussing the event together and providing the most accurate collaborative 
notes as possible.  
When the questionnaire was completed, participants were separated and 
engaged in a further unrelated filler task for five minutes. The main recall test was 
then administered in the form of a cued-recall questionnaire which all participants 
completed individually.  Participants were instructed to think back to the event they 
had witnessed and to report their answers accurately as if they were real witnesses 
providing information for the police. Importantly, participants were provided with a 
specific instruction to only report what they had seen themselves (“Only report what 
YOU saw”).  Participants were asked to provide a free recall account of the video, and 
to answer a further eight questions (comprising four neutral questions and four 
‘critical’ questions). Following Gabbert et al. (2003) the critical questions comprised 
two questions pertaining to information that was only visible from perspective of one 
participant or the other. There was also a final question asking participants to state 
whether or not they thought the girl was guilty or innocent based on what they had 
seen themselves in the film clip.  For each question, participants were asked to 
indicate how confident they were in the their answers using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
Not very confident).   
After completing the recall questions they were then required to rate their co-
participant.  The first part of the rating task incorporated several measures of liking 
 11 
(e.g. What is your general impression of the other participant?  How likeable is the 
other participant?).  Each item included a 7-point scale with higher ratings indicating 
a more favorable evaluation (see Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).  Participants then rated 
their co-participants on the following attributes: reliability, confidence, 
perceptiveness, attentiveness, trustworthiness, competence and overall accuracy.  Two 
ratings were requested for each attribute: a straightforward rating of the other 
participant on that attribute (e.g. 1 = Not reliable; 7 = Very reliable) and a relative-to-
self rating (e.g. 1 = Less reliable that me; 4 = Same as me; 7 = More reliable than me).  
Participants were then asked to indicate who they believed had provided the most 
accurate memory report of the witnessed event (them or their co-participant) and also 
asked how they believed their co-participant would evaluate them (e.g. What 
impression do you think your co-participant has of you? How likeable do you think 
your co-participant will find you?  Do you think your ratings of each other will be 
similar?).  
In a post-test manipulation check participants were asked if they had been 
suspicious as to the purpose of the study.  None of the participants indicated that they 
had been aware of the manipulation. 
Coding 
Using Gabbert et al.’s (2003) 39-item coding checklist, each item of free-recall data 
was scored as a correct item of information, an incorrect item of information, or an 
‘extra’ item of information obtained from a co-witness.  
 
 
Results 
 
Data analyses focused on the following issues.  Firstly, we sought to establish, in line 
with previous research, whether co-witness performance was impaired relative to 
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individual performance as a result of post event information encountered in the 
discussions.  Secondly, we examined whether witnesses who discussed the event with 
a co-witness already known to them were more likely to include information acquired 
from that co-witness in their own reported recall of the event compared to witnesses 
who discussed the event with strangers.  Thirdly, we examined whether the nature of 
the relationship with the co-witness played any role in the degree of any susceptibility 
to misinformation observed. Finally, we investigated whether perceptions of co-
witness accuracy differed according to the nature of the relationship between the 
witnesses. 
 
Event recall 
 
Free recall data was coded as either correct or incorrect to determine which 
participants produced the most accurate overall account of the witnessed event.  
Accounts were coded with respect to the version of the event that was viewed by the 
participants (i.e. details which could not have been seen by that participant but were 
reported in their individual account following discussion with a co-participant were 
scored as incorrect). There were no significant differences between conditions for the 
number of correct details provided in the free recall phases.  However, consistent with 
our first hypothesis, there was a significant difference in total recall errors provided 
by condition (F (3, 95) = 6.28, MSE = 6.21, p = .001, p2 = .17).  Post hoc tests 
revealed that participants in the individual condition made significantly fewer errors 
than those in the friends and couples condition.  However the error rate for 
participants in stranger dyads did not differ from that of individuals or from friends or 
couples dyads.  The number of recorded errors did not differ between friends and 
couple dyads (see Table 1).  
 13 
Additional coding indicated that there was no significant difference in the recall errors 
once items of misinformation included in the paired conditions were excluded.  Thus, 
the main source of recall error was misinformation obtained from a co-witness.   
In terms of overall susceptibility to misinformation (i.e. likelihood of incorporating 
misinformation in a subsequent recall account) friends and couple pairs did not appear 
to differ from each other.  In fact, for both pairings, 58% of participants included 
misinformation obtained from their co-witness.  Thus, to determine whether a prior 
relationship with the co-witness was associated with increased susceptibility to 
misinformation, a new variable was created signifying whether or not the co-
witnesses had an existing relationship (Friends and Couples conditions combined) or 
not (Strangers condition).  Chi squared analysis revealed that prior acquaintance 
(stranger vs. friend/couple) was significantly associated with the incorporation of 
misinformation (yes vs. no) from that co-witness, ,2 (1) = 5.45, p = .02, φ = .28.  
Overall, 58% of participants who discussed the event with a co-witness already 
known to them included at least one item of misinformation obtained from their co-
witness in their own individual free recall account compared to 29% of participants 
who interacted with a stranger.  
Attributions of guilt 
All participants were asked whether the girl took money from a wallet (i.e. the most 
forensically relevant critical question).  Chi squared analysis revealed a significant 
association between witness condition (individual; stranger; friend; couple) and 
whether the participant reported that the girl took the money (yes; no);  2(3)=10.89, 
p<.01, φ = .48.  While none of the participants in the Individual witness condition 
reported unseen information, half the participants in the Friends condition (50 %) and 
the Couples condition (50 %), and 17 % of participants in the Stranger condition 
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reported that the girl took money from a wallet even though they had not seen this in 
their version of the event.   
In order to see whether participants who had not seen the theft themselves 
would produce unfounded guilt attributions as a consequence of discussions with their 
co-witness, participants were asked whether or not the girl was guilty based on what 
they had seen on the video.  Overall, 72% of participants reported that the girl was 
guilty.  For participants who had not actually seen a crime occur (video Version A), 
54% reported that the girl was guilty.  As shown in Table 2, Stranger pairs were least 
likely to make unfounded attributions of guilt (42%), participants in the Individual 
and Friends conditions were equally likely to make guilty attributions (50%) while 
participants in the Couples condition were most likely to attribute guilt (75%). There 
was no overall significant association between guilt attribution and condition.  In 
order to examine the effects of prior relationship, a new variable with two levels (1 = 
strangers; 2 = friends and couples) was computed which excluded participants in the 
Individual condition.  This revealed a significant effect of prior acquaintance on 
unfounded attributions of guilt emerged with participants paired with strangers less 
likely to believe that guilty information had been presented than participants paired 
with a friend or romantic partner, 2 (1) = 4.27, p  = .04, φ = .29. 
For participants who saw a crime take place (video Version B), 100% of 
participants in the Individual and Strangers conditions reported that the girl was 
guilty, whereas 17% in the Friends condition and 25% in the Couples condition 
reported that she was not guilty (contrary to what they had seen) following 
discussions with their co-witness who had not witnessed a crime (see Table 2). There 
was a significant overall association between condition and guilt attribution for 
participants viewing this version of events, 2 (3) = 7.77, p = .05, φ = .35.  In order to 
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examine the effects of prior relationship a second analysis was conducted, again 
excluding participants in the Individual condition.  This revealed a significant 
association between perceived guilt and prior acquaintance, such that participants in 
the previous acquaintance conditions were more likely to make unwarranted 
innocence attributions than those who were not previously acquainted with their co-
witness or worked alone, 2 (1) = 5.58, p = .02, φ = .34.  
Co-witness Evaluation 
Preliminary exploration of the data revealed that similar ratings were given in the 
Friend and Couple conditions. Thus, again, the new prior relationship variable  
(combining Friends and Couples conditions) was used in the analyses.  For all co-
witness evaluation items, participants with a pre-existing relationship (friend or 
couple) provided a significantly more positive evaluation of their co-witness (see 
Table 3).  To further investigate the relationship between co-witness liking, 
susceptibility to misinformation and co-witness relationship, a univariate ANOVA 
was conducted with rated liking as the dependent measure. As expected there was a 
main effect of relationship on rated liking such that participants sharing a pre-existing 
relationship with their co-witness rated them as more likeable, F (1, 68) = 18.28, p  < 
.01, p2 = .21).    Participants who incorporated misinformation from their cowitness 
also gave higher ratings of likeability, F(1,68) = 10.52, p < .01, p2 = .13).  However, 
this was qualified by a significant interaction where participants who incorporated 
misinformation only rated their co-witness as more likeable if they were not 
previously acquainted, F(1,68) = 6.07, p < .05, p2 = .08 (see Figure 1).  
Interestingly, there was a significant association between perceived accuracy and 
relationship such that 79% of participants who were paired with a stranger (no pre-
existing relationship) indicated that they believed they were more accurate than their 
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co-witness while only 46% of participants who witnessed the event with a friend or 
romantic partner believed they were the more accurate witness of the pair, 2 (1) = 
7.25, p < .01, φ = .32).  
 
Discussion 
The aim of the current study was examine whether prior acquaintance with a co-
witness played a role in the co-witness effect.  Specifically, we were interested in 
whether the nature of the prior acquaintance would be associated with increased 
susceptibility to misinformation from that co-witness.  Results indicated that, in line 
with previous research, all co-witness dyads were susceptible to misinformation from 
their co-witness and, as a consequence, produced less accurate recall accounts than 
participants who did not interact with another witness (see also Gabbert et al., 2004; 
Mori, 2003; Wright et al., 2000).  However, witnesses who were previously 
acquainted with their co-witness (as a friend or romantic partner) were significantly 
more likely to incorporate information obtained solely from their co-witness into their 
own accounts.  There did not appear to be any systematic difference in the recall of 
between previously acquainted pairs (friend or couple dyads) in the current sample or 
the number of items of misinformation included.  Participants in a friend or couple co-
witnessing dyad were more likely to assert that the target took money from a wallet 
following discussions with a co-witness who had viewed a theft (even though they 
themselves had not seen that particular scene).  Similarly, participants who discussed 
the event with a previous acquaintance who did not view a theft (even though they 
themselves had seen it) were less likely to attribute guilt to the target.    
Unsurprisingly, individuals in relationships (friendship, romantic partners) 
rated their co-participants significantly more positively than those who were not 
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previously acquainted with their co-participant, and were less likely to believe they 
would be more accurate than their co-participant.  Finally, there was an interaction 
between accepting misinformation and the degree of prior acquaintance on ratings of 
co-witness liking, such that co-witness liking was higher when misinformation had 
been incorporated, but only when the co-witness dyad consisted of strangers.  Thus, it 
appears that the existence of a previous acquaintance or relationship between co-
witnesses can have a detrimental effect of the veracity of subsequent accounts, as a 
result of enhanced susceptibility to misinformation from a known co-witness.   
Why might co-witnesses be more likely to accept misinformation (i.e. 
information they have not seen directly themselves) from a friend or partner as 
opposed to a stranger?  The source of the misinformation is clearly very important and 
previous research has demonstrated that source credibility is an important component 
of the co-witness effect (Kwong See et al., 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; see also 
Lampinen & Smith, 1995).  In the current study, participants were most influenced by 
co-participants they had a relationship with which fits well with classic conformity 
theories predicting that the degree of identification determines level of conformity 
(Walker & Heyns, 1962).  Furthermore, participants with existing relationships rated 
their co-participants most positively in terms of liking and other relevant attributes.  
Taken together it might be argued that - as we tend to engage in relationships with 
others whom we identify with or like - it is not altogether surprising that we will be 
most influenced by friends or romantic partners.  One possible explanation is that in 
certain contexts heuristic processing guides responses and may lead to increased 
compliance (i.e. if we like and identify with our co-witness, we spend less time 
engaging in cognitively demanding evaluations of information obtained from them).  
Drawing on the social cognition literature, there is considerably support for this line 
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of argument (e.g. Burger, Soroka, Gonzago, Murphy & Somervell, 2001; Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Cialdini, 2001; Frenzen & Davis, 1990).  Increased 
compliance has also been associated with the use of heuristics such as incidental 
similarity (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson 2004; Emswiller, Deux, & 
Willits, 1971), physical attractiveness (Reingen & Kernan, 1993) and previous 
interaction (Burger, Horita, Kinoshita, Roberts, & Vera, 1997; Dolinski, Nawrat, & 
Rudak, 2001).  However, compliance, as measured in these studies, has not tended to 
be memorial in nature.   
The current findings also suggest that where no previous relationship exists, 
participants who provide more positive ‘liking’ ratings for their co-participants are 
also more likely accept misinformation from their co-witness.  Liking has been shown 
to be independently associated with compliance irrespective of previous relationship 
(Goei, Lindsey, Boster, Skalski, & Bowman, 2003).  However, because measures of 
liking were recorded after the recall sessions, it is not possible to determine whether 
participants who liked each other were more likely to accepted misinformation from 
each other or whether accepting another’s version of events makes one more likeable.  
Furthermore it was not possible to ascertain whether this effect was due to a 
generalized reciprocity of liking effect (Kenny, 1994; see also Eastwick, Finkel, 
Mochon & Ariely, 2007).  Future research should therefore seek to determine the 
causal structure underpinning this effect through manipulating likeability of the 
information source in a co-witness interaction.  
In some respects our results run counter to findings in the transactive memory 
literature which tend to suggest that individuals in close relationships outperform 
stranger pairs in recall tasks by means of mutual cueing and increased cue 
effectiveness (Andersson, 2001; Andersson & Ronnberg, 1995, 1997; Fussell & 
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Krauss, 1989).  However, the task of the current study, to produce an accurate recall 
account as opposed to the fullest possible account based on collaborative 
remembering, is rather different to the type of task typically explored in investigations 
of transactive memory.  In the present study dyads were deliberately shown an event 
filmed from different perspectives in order to assess the extent to which they would 
incorporate misinformation from the other person.  This is unlike many transactive 
memory tasks where there is typically no intention to mislead.   
Previous investigations of the co-witness effect have not considered the role 
played by any extant relationship between the co-witnesses.  Our results suggest that a 
relationship between co-witness enhances susceptibility to misinformation.  In 
addition to furthering our understanding of memory conformity, these data provide 
further support to work which has demonstrated that misinformation should not be 
seen as a purely cognitive phenomenon (e.g. Clark & Stephenson, 1995; McCloskey 
& Zaragoza, 1985) and has demonstrated that the social context in which 
remembering and recall occur can markedly effect that quality of the ‘memory’ that is 
produced.  Specifically, as argued by Bartlett (1932), a key determinant of what is 
remembered in any given situation is the relationship between the ‘narrator’ and his or 
her ‘audience’ (Bartlett, 1932; see also Hyman, 1994; Ost & Costall, 2002).  As 
demonstrated in the current study, the co-witness conformity effect is indeed modified 
by the nature of that relationship – in this case a prior acquaintance between the 
members of the dyad.  As the present study did not set out to examine in detail the 
nature of the relationship or interactions, many questions remain.    Are there, for 
example, qualitative differences between the ways in which acquaintances and non-
acquaintances discuss events they have jointly witnessed?  Do acquaintances and non 
acquaintances use different cues to judge the validity of the claims made by their co-
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witness?  What role does the nature of the acquaintance play in susceptibility to 
misinformation?  At present, it is unclear exactly what is driving the effects observed 
in the current study and this remains an important avenue for future research 
The ‘guilt attributions’ made by participants in the current study suggest that 
other contextual factors may also play an important role in eyewitness error.  Despite 
the instruction to only report what had been seen in the original stimulus event (i.e. 
“only report what YOU saw”), there appeared to be a tendency to display what might 
be deemed a crime expectancy bias.   For instance, in the Individual condition, 50% of 
participants who did not see a crime made an invalid attribution of guilt, suggesting 
some expectation that a crime had taken place.  Given the important applied 
implications, future research should focus on examining how biases of this type are 
affected when confirming evidence is provided by a trusted partner. 
There are a number of limitations associated with the current study.  Although 
consistent with criteria in associated literature, there was considerable variation in the 
length of relationships reported by both friends and couples (although these did not 
differ significantly from each other between conditions).  It may be the case that co-
witnesses in more established relationships will perform and influence each other 
differently to those in shorter relationships.  However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that length of relationship (for friends and couples) is not associated with 
performance in collaborative tasks while quality of relationship (although not 
explored in the current study) may be (Johansson, Andersson, & Rönnberg, 2005).  
Also, the gender combination in participating dyads was not controlled in order to 
retain naturally occurring pairings for either friendship or romantic partners.  
However, previous research does not appear to have identified particular patterns of 
influence associated with gender within collaborative groups (i.e. female, male and 
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mixed groups (Andersson, 2001; Weldon, Blaire, & Huebsch, 2000) although there is 
limited evidence that female participants may be more susceptible to certain kinds of 
source monitoring errors (Crombag, Wagenaar & van Koppen, 1996).  Future 
research might also incorporate a longer delay between initial encoding and the recall 
task to better reflect the likely experience of actual witnesses. 
To summarise, the present study demonstrated that previously acquainted co-
witness produce less accurate individual accounts than both non-acquainted co-
witnesses, and witnesses who do not discuss the incident with anybody else.  To the 
best of our knowledge, these are novel findings with considerable applied 
consequences.  In real life eyewitness situations, participants are highly likely to 
discuss the events they have seen with those around them (Paterson & Kemp, 2006).  
Given that in many such situations, those other people are likely to be friends or 
romantic partners, the current findings have important implications for how the 
testimony of such witnesses should be considered. 
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Table 1. Mean number of correct, incorrect and misinformation items included in free 
recall by condition 
 
 Total Correct  Total Incorrect  Misinformation Items only 
 M SD  M SD  M SD 
Individuals 17.42 4.20  .54 .72  .54 .72 
Strangers 18.72 2.32  1.21 1.22  .63 .77 
Friends 18.00 2.98  1.50 1.10  .67 .82 
Couples 17.50 3.86  1.71 1.71  1.08 .65 
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Table 2: Percentage of participants making incorrect attributions of guilt or innocence 
by condition 
 Valid Attributions of Guilt  Invalid Attributions of Guilt 
 Proportion  Proportion 
Individuals 1.00  .50 
Strangers 1.00  .42 
Friends .83  .50 
Couples .75  .75 
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Table 3: Ratings of co-participant by prior relationship  
 Pre-existing relationship  No pre-existing relationship     
 M SD  M SD  t d 
Overall, what is your general impression of your co-
participant (1 = Negative; 7 = Positive)** 
6.56 (.65)  5.33 (1.31)  -4.35 -1.01 
Overall, how would you rate your co-participant? (1 = Not 
at all likeable; 7 = Very  likeable)** 
6.67 (.59)  5.25 (1.57)  -4.28 -1.02 
Memory reliability (1 = Not reliable; 7 = Very reliable** 5.37 (1.04)  4.29 (1.12)  -4.04 -0.97 
Confidence (1 = Not confident; 7 = Very confident)** 5.37 (1.21)  4.54 (1.17)  -2.77 -0.66 
Perceptive (1 = Not perceptive; 7 = Very perceptive)* 5.25 (.91)  4.71 (.95)  -2.34 -0.56 
Attentive (1 = Not attentive; 7 = Very attentive)** 5.44 (1.30)  4.62 (1.01)  -2.67 -0.64 
Trustworthy (1 = Not trustworthy; 7 = Very trustworthy)** 6.47 (.71)  5.08 (1.17)  -5.34 -1.89 
Competent (1 = Not competent; 7 = Very competent)** 6.04 (.97)  5.21 (1.14)  -3.25 -0.78 
Accurate (1= Not accurate; 7 = Very accurate)* 5.04 (1.05)  4.42 (1.05)  -2.37 -0.57 
*p < .05.  ** p < .01
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Figure 1: Ratings of co-witness liking as a function of prior relationship and 
susceptibility to misinformation from a co-witness 
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